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1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
2	RICHMOND DIVISION
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4	ePLUS, INC., :
5	Plaintiff, : v. : Civil Action
6	: No. 3:09CV620 LAWSON SOFTWARE, INC.,
7	: March 7, 2012 Defendant. :
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10	COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT OF CONFERENCE CALL
11	BEFORE THE HONORABLE ROBERT E. PAYNE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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16	APPEARANCES: (Via telephone)
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First, I have the letter here from Mr. Strapp dated the 7th of March. He gave a copy of it that

have several things, too.

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says to "Counsel of Record." And the first item is Mr. Hager and what his situation is.

Mr. Strapp, since you raised the point, go right ahead. I've read the letter.

MR. STRAPP: Yes, Your Honor. I would like Mr. Merritt to address the point with Mr. Hager.

THE COURT: That's fine. All right.

MR. MERRITT: Your Honor, good afternoon.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MR. MERRITT: The Hager situation is fairly straightforward. You've read our letter. I won't embellish that. He was Lawson's sole witness when you took evidence in advance of issuing the injunction. There are matters to which Mr. Hager could and we believe should testify, not only on some timeline issues and on the colorability issue, but certainly in response to some fairly pointed instruction we received from the Court along the way as to Your Honor's interest in exactly how that record was laid before the Court.

In January of 2012, Mr. Hager gave a deposition when this hearing was previously scheduled last year. At that time he was represented by the Gibson, Dunn firm. It was stated that he would have been present last year and he intended to be present

in person.

The parties, as you may recall, made some prehearing exchanges and perhaps even submissions of proposed deposition excerpts. And at the time Lawson objected to deposition excerpts from Mr. Hager on the ground that they intended to make him available in person at the hearing, and it was, therefore, unnecessary.

We understand that there's been a passage of time. We started after the Federal Circuit rule reaching out to Lawson's counsel to see if Mr. Hager would still be available. They did not have a clear answer for several weeks. We were recently advised that Mr. Hager has now obtained separate counsel in the person of Rick Witthoefft, who I know is well-known to the Court. The last I have heard on this from Mr. Witthoefft was an email midday today saying that he's not able to report Mr. Hager's final position on whether he will appear but believes we would be wise to prepare for the hearing as if he would not be present in person.

We understand, Your Honor, that you have previously indicated a very strong desire to have witnesses available in person to give their testimony to be cross-examined and to provide answers to any

questions that the Court might have.

We certainly share that strong bias.

However, we don't have control over making Mr. Hager appear, and if we're not able to, we're going to need the Court's guidance and its permission to submit what testimony we do have by other means, and we didn't want to wait until the last minute to raise the issue.

THE COURT: Is Mr. Hager still an officer of the company?

MR. MERRITT: No, sir. He's left Lawson's employment.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. MERRITT: And I believe he had already left Lawson's employment at the time he gave his deposition in January of 2012, but I believe Mr. Thomasch defended that deposition, and he can correct me if that's wrong.

MR. STRAPP: Where is Mr. Hager now?

MR. THOMASCH: Your Honor, this is Mr.

Thomasch.

THE COURT: Excuse me a minute, Mr. Thomasch. Where is Mr. Hager now?

MR. MERRITT: Your Honor, he is the CEO of another company, we believe. We have seen its website. We believe it's in the Minneapolis area, but

again, that's from memory, and I don't have that in front of me.

THE COURT: All right.

All right. Mr. Thomasch. Excuse me.

MR. THOMASCH: Yes, sir, Your Honor. To answer your last question, my understanding is that Mr. Hager is at a company called Kroll Ontrack in Minneapolis, Minnesota. His employment with Lawson ended in December of 2011.

He was deposed in January of 2012. At the time of that deposition he was not employed. He was between jobs. At that time the contempt proceeding was scheduled to go to trial in February of 2012, and when asked whether he intended to attend trial at his deposition in January of 2012, he said that that was his current intention.

It's been more than a year since then. We did always have a preference to have testimony live and to bring our witnesses, and it is our intention to bring those Lawson witnesses who we control whose testimony will be relevant to the proceeding to court. Whether they are to be called by us or whether they are to be called by the plaintiff, we will bring them.

We don't have that luxury with Mr. Hager.

That is ultimately his determination. And as Mr.

Merritt informed you, he has separate counsel. And we have the same information that Mr. Merritt has in regard to whether that's going to occur.

testimony of witnesses who were going to be present in person. Obviously, if Mr. Hager, who is unavailable to both parties, is not going to testify at trial, we would withdraw objections that were made on the basis of his availability. Obviously, there might be objections to individual questions, but not to the use of a deposition as a whole. We would not have a problem. He was deposed for seven hours. He appeared voluntarily after his employment had ended, and he was questioned at great length on all issues relevant to the contempt proceeding, and it may well be that the parties, both of us, wind up using that testimony.

There is certainly testimony from Mr. Hager that we affirmatively want to bring to the Court's attention and we would want to use his deposition as well if he doesn't appear live.

THE COURT: The letter here from Mr. Strapp says, "Thus, we wish to confirm whether there is any acceptable alternative for presenting evidence if Mr. Hager refuses to appear."

Is that a way of asking whether he can be

deposed for purposes of having his testimony available at trial what in the state court proceedings would be called a de bene esse deposition? But, of course, that procedure doesn't exist in the federal system by that name or by any other name. Depositions are depositions. But were you asking for another deposition I guess is what I'm asking?

MR. MERRITT: Your Honor, we did consider that as an option. We don't have, as Your Honor knows, a true de bene esse procedure in federal practice. There are some things that sort of approach it obliquely. We assumed it would be within the Court's discretion and oversight of these proceedings to authorize it if we wanted to do it. It is fairly time consuming and fairly late in the game, and much of this has been covered.

One of the difficulties -- the two difficulties we have are, one, there are questions of demeanor that can never be captured in a deposition no matter how artfully it's taken.

And, second, there are some materials that were produced by Lawson as a result of the Court's rulings on the waiver of the attorney-client privilege that were not available when his deposition was taken and he has not been confronted with them.

THE COURT: All right. So what do you want? Another deposition or what? I just need to know what to do and hear what their position is.

MR. MERRITT: Judge, would you give us until tomorrow morning to determine whether we think that is worth the candle and let you know if we are seeking leave for that? Or in the alternative, if we can just be allowed to rely on the record that's already been developed?

THE COURT: I guess I'll hear from you at some point in the morning on it.

What's your position on it, Mr. Thomasch?

Let's assume for the moment they want another

deposition. What is your position? Do you know?

MR. THOMASCH: Our position, Your Honor, is it is unnecessary on the demeanor point. The deposition was filmed, and so there is a video of the deposition and not just a transcript, and I believe that does a good job of capturing exactly what Mr. Hager's demeanor was when he was answering questions.

With regard to the privilege documents, I know that in fact it was my apparently erroneous allowance of Mr. Hager to be questioned on privilege documents that served in part for Your Honor's ruling

that we waived the privilege because there are some documents that had been produced before the deposition that were used at the deposition in which Mr. Hager says that we have to do this because the attorneys tell us we have to do it, and we allowed that questioning to explain what his state of mind was when the changes were made. So those documents have been the subject of questioning.

I don't know if there are any other specific Hager documents. I'm not aware of any that are going to be used as exhibits that were subsequently produced that he hasn't been questioned on, but I think he has been thoroughly questioned on the issues in the case, and we would think at the moment there is no need subject to any showing that may be made by plaintiff's counsel.

THE COURT: You don't need him, in other words?

MR. THOMASCH: We feel that we have testimony on the matters that are at issue and we would want to present that testimony through his existing deposition, which was taken after he left the company but in anticipation of the contempt proceeding.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. MERRITT: Your Honor, one possibility of

resolving this short of taking another deposition, I do believe there is a small number of documents that were produced after the Hager deposition that were in the privilege category and were subject to the Court's ruling.

If we could show those to Lawson, get a stipulation that they are in fact Lawson business records that were received, sent or seen by Mr. Hager, and be permitted to place them in the record without objection, then that might be sufficient to lay the record we need to make in your court without going through the deposition exercise again.

THE COURT: Well, that's something that sounds to me like you-all need to talk about and see. Let Mr. Thomasch make a decision based on the documents that he has in front of him at the time you're talking about it instead of trying to do it over the phone.

MR. MERRITT: We will do that.

THE COURT: So I think that's the best way to do it.

But why then don't I hear from you with a final decision on all this on Monday morning at 11:30. Can we do that?

MR. MERRITT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Is that satisfactory, Mr. Thomasch, for you?

MR. THOMASCH: Yes, it is, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. That way it will give you-all time to sort out where you stand on this issue.

Borrowing a new deposition, I would think that under the circumstances it would be appropriate to allow the use of his testimony to the extent he's been deposed about it, to the extent that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow it to be used in accord with the proper law on that subject.

And I assume that's what you-all would prefer to do. Is that correct from your standpoint? I mean, you would prefer to do it if you can't get him here in person.

MR. MERRITT: Yes, sir, that's correct.

THE COURT: And if you don't need another deposition.

Mr. Thomasch, I assume that's what you would propose to do if you decide you don't need another deposition or if he can't be here in person; is that right?

MR. THOMASCH: That is correct, Your Honor.

There may be some objections we maintain, but, as you

said, per the federal rules.

THE COURT: Yeah. That's what the rules are for. We will deal with that when the time comes.

MR. THOMASCH: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. That takes care of that situation. The second item in Mr. Strapp's letter is the scope of the contempt proceeding.

Mr. Strapp, are you addressing that?
MR. STRAPP: Yes, Your Honor.

During a telephone conference between the parties in the past few weeks, we learned that there is a disagreement regarding potential witnesses that we intend to call at the hearing and evidence that we intend to present regarding Lawson's ongoing infringement and ongoing violation of the injunction by using the actual infringing systems. Not the systems as modified with RQC, but the systems that were found to infringe with RSS.

When we raised this issue on a call, Mr. Thomasch indicated that Lawson's understanding was that that evidence would be outside the scope of the order that Your Honor entered on January 24 regarding the order of proof for the contempt hearing. And we took a look back at that order.

Our understanding of that order is that it

would definitely include evidence within the scope. It would include evidence that goes to the issue of whether or not Lawson is in violation of the order of injunction. That comes from paragraph B on the first page of the order. And that's docket 1002.

THE COURT: What's the case number? Give me the case number. I want to look it up here.

MR. STRAPP: The case number is 3:09CV620.

THE COURT: You would think that would be emblazoned upon my memory, but it isn't.

What's the docket number?

MR. STRAPP: 1002.

THE COURT: All right. And you were referring to what paragraph?

MR. STRAPP: Page 1, paragraph B.

THE COURT: All right. I've read that. Okay. Go ahead.

MR. STRAPP: Our understanding is that
Lawson's view of this order and the scope that Lawson
intends to place on the order comes from page 2 of the
order, paragraph E. And on page 2 of the order,
paragraph E, Your Honor set forth a structure for
proof on the point with respect to the two-part test
that is set out in the Federal Circuit's TiVo opinion
with the first part of the proof offerings being

directed to the issue of whether or not the modified products are more than colorably different, and the second part of the TiVo test and the proof offerings being directed to the infringement issue.

While we agree and understand and intend to present proof offerings on those two issues in the order that Your Honor has set forth, we don't believe that that in and of itself is a limitation on what comes in at the actual contempt hearing. For example --

THE COURT: All right. Well, let me hear from Mr. Thomasch on this.

MR. THOMASCH: Your Honor, we are prepared to try any case that you want tried. We have requested that the Court bifurcate the TiVo portion of the proceeding so that the first phase would be limited to colorability. And it has been our concern that the plaintiffs have attempted to blur the line between infringement and colorability throughout this proceeding. And in the conversation that Mr. Strapp indicates that he had with me, I did not indicate that we felt that this was entirely beyond the bounds of the hearing as much as we didn't understand how it fit into the order, and that we might need to jointly seek guidance from the Court.

We do not believe, however, that the issue of whether or not this issue that he's talking about comes into colorability. I just want to stress what Mr. Strapp is saying and the underlying evidence we could not disagree with him more about, but what he is arguing is that we are in contempt even if the RQC redevelopment, the redesigned product, is more than colorably different and is non-infringing, either or both of those. He's saying, Nevertheless, you're still in contempt because you did something with a customer who downloaded RQC but may not have run RQC, and that's the issue he now wants to say can be tried.

If Your Honor wants to hear evidence on that case, we are more than happy to present it in the multiple discussions that the parties have had about what would proceed at the hearing. That has not been the subject of discussion at all. And it caught me by somewhat surprise that they were still pursuing those allegations, but we have an answer to them. It's compelling and we're prepared to present it, but we do not want it to infiltrate the separate analysis of the two-part TiVo case, the colorability and the infringement analysis.

TiVo tells us how that's to be done. And the issue of whether we're in contempt because the

redesign was a fraud, as they have alleged, is very, very different from this new issue, which is whether we're in contempt because we somehow continue to deal with a customer who had downloaded the redesign but they say didn't install it, and we say they're wrong.

MR. STRAPP: Your Honor, this is Mr. Strapp. If the concern of Lawson is that these issues must be segregated, in other words, the issue of whether Lawson has continued to support its customer's use of the original infringing systems, must be segregated from the issue of whether or not RQC is a more than colorable difference from RSS. We're entirely in agreement that those two issues can and should be segregated at the contempt hearing.

But one issue that I do want to correct I think there might be a misperception about is that this is a newly raised issue. This was a subject of discovery at length preceding the contempt hearing that was scheduled in February of 2012. There were multiple depositions taken on this issue. There were interrogatories exchanged and documents exchanged.

So this isn't a new issue that ePlus is raising at the last minute but rather it's an issue that's been at the forefront of both parties' discovery efforts for several months.

THE COURT: Apart from your discovery efforts, is it alleged in the petition seeking a contempt?

MR. STRAPP: Well, Your Honor, at the time that we submitted -- I don't have that petition in front of me.

THE COURT: You've got a computer in front of you, don't you?

MR. STRAPP: Right. At the time we submitted that petition that was back in September of 2011, I believe. And September 2011, our understanding based on the representations that Lawson had publicly made because we didn't yet have discovery regarding contempt was that Lawson had made available to its customers and its customers were actually downloading, installing and implementing this new RQC module and that the customers were no longer using the adjudicated infringing systems.

When we asked in an interrogatory about which customers had actually installed and implemented the design-around RQC module, we were shocked and surprised to learn that actually Lawson couldn't tell us of a single customer who had installed and implemented RQC because Lawson said it simply didn't know. It just knew customers had downloaded RQC, but

that downloading RQC doesn't mean that a customer was actually using RQC.

So we learned about that in discovery. And we took quite a bit of discovery because, as you can imagine, we were surprised and we thought, Well, if Lawson is actually still supporting the use of the original infringing systems, that couldn't be more relevant to the issue of whether or not Lawson has violated the actual terms of the injunction.

So that's been the subject of discovery. And to the extent that we did allege that Lawson was in violation of the injunction, obviously a violation of the injunction would include the continuing and ongoing maintenance and support and encouragement of its customers' use of the original infringing systems.

MR. THOMASCH: Your Honor, if I might briefly respond.

THE COURT: Yes, go ahead.

MR. THOMASCH: I just would like to clarify that, one, as far as whether the issue is new or not, there was discovery about it. That's not disputed. What I meant to say is it has not been part of the discussion as to what this hearing would be about at all in my memory at any time. And we have repeatedly requested that there actually be a petition that

alleged what it is that we're said to have done and the basis for it for contempt. And we have not received one with regard to this issue.

The only thing that there was was a motion seeking permission, an order to show -- I'm sorry. Seeking an order to show cause as to why we shouldn't be held in contempt. But that related to the alleged lack of a colorable difference between the old systems and the redesign systems. And that's the case that we expected to go to a hearing on on April 2 and which we're ready. If Your Honor wants broader issues, we will handle them.

The questions that came up at the deposition were with regard to, in the abstract, the status of customers who downloaded RQC. This is computer software. So they downloaded it. But had they gone the next step and installed it and were they running it in production? And witnesses said, Well, we didn't know about that.

What we also put out in interrogatories that clarified that before any support was given to those customers, their status was checked, and only customers who were confirmed to have installed and implemented RQC were eligible to get service during the period in which the injunction was in effect

against them.

There could have been service of RSS customers who were health care customers in the six-month period where the injunction was not implemented against them, but we've been very strict in not providing service to anyone without having confirmed that they had implemented RQC.

Indeed, after the depositions, we went back and we rechecked with every customer and confirmed that every customer is using RQC in its production mode. And if that issue is to be tried, we will supplement our discovery responses and we will bring that evidence to court because it's simply a question of what were we prohibited from doing. We were prohibited from providing support to people who were still using the old system, and we have not done that. We have not violated the order at all. But that isn't the issue that we thought the Court teed up in its order of January 24.

MR. MERRITT: Judge Payne, this is Craig

Merritt. You had asked a question a moment ago about

ePlus's early papers on the contempt proceeding and

what was addressed in those. I've taken a quick look,

and if you're able to pull up docket No. 808, it's an

ePlus reply brief filed on September 23, 2011.

THE COURT: Just a minute. What is it? 1 It's document 808. 2 MR. MERRITT: 3 THE COURT: There isn't any 808. MR. MERRITT: It was filed September 23, 4 5 2011. Docket No. 808. THE COURT: These docket numbers are out of 6 7 order. Okay. Okay. Where is it? 8 MR. MERRITT: In any event --9 THE COURT: Where is it? What page? 10 MR. MERRITT: It's page 15. 11 THE COURT: Okay. Let me get there. 12 MR. MERRITT: Yes, sir. 13 THE COURT: All right. MR. MERRITT: You'll see the heading "D," and 14 as early as September 23, 2011, ePlus had put in 15 16 contention its view that Lawson was continuing to 17 encourage its customers to keep using the infringing 18 systems that included RSS. 19 Now, I don't know --20 THE COURT: Wait just a minute. I don't see that entry on page 15. 21 22 MR. STRAPP: Your Honor, the page number at 23 the bottom of the page is 13. 24 MR. MERRITT: It's page 13. I'm sorry. Ι 25 was looking at the top at the Court's numbering. Μy

apologies.

THE COURT: Page 13. Okay.

MR. MERRITT: And you'll see the subtopic heading "D."

THE COURT: "Defendant has violated the injunction order by encouraging its customers to continue using the infringing systems."

MR. MERRITT: And you had asked the question if that issue had been put in play by ePlus's initial papers. I did find it in the reply. I haven't had a chance to look at the initial filing, but it's certainly been in play in the case since September 23, 2011.

I can't speak to Mr. Thomasch's comment about when that may have ceased because we haven't received any updated discovery from Lawson on that, but at that point it was certainly placed in issue by ePlus.

MR. THOMASCH: Craig, may I ask you because I don't have that brief in front of me, does that section that you're referring to have anything to do with the download status versus the installation status or is that predicated on the webinar from June of 2011?

MR. MERRITT: At that point it was predicated on the communications from Lawson to its customers

that they were not prohibited from continuing to use the infringing software.

MR. THOMASCH: Okay. With all due respect, that I would say, I would suggest, is not the issue that was raised in connection with the allegations made in the letter of today by Mr. Strapp, which relate to whether when customers were encouraged to transfer over to RQC, the first step in that process is to download RQC, and it is only after that that you install it and uninstall RSS. It related to that.

I think that you are inadvertently moving to something that sounds like but is actually fundamentally different from what we're talking about.

THE COURT: All right, gentlemen and ladies, this: I did not intend in any way to limit paragraph B of the order of January the 24th by the terms of paragraph E setting forth the order of proofs on the TiVo issue. E was designed to deal with the colorability and infringing allocation and to the parts of your letters which had extensively addressed how that ought to be done. E doesn't limit that which is permitted by B.

B permits a hearing on whether Lawson at any time after May 23, 2011, was in violation of the order entered into on that date, except you don't have the

prohibitions that are precluded or excluded from that reach of that provision.

Now, in my judgment, you have to go look at the petition for an order to show cause and the materials submitted in connection therewith in order to identify the issues on which the contempt hearing is going to be had as to whether or not conduct constitutes contempt or not because that's what's framed the question.

I have no idea whether there have been pleadings that have amended the original petition.

And I can't look at it now and don't know. But one way or the other, you-all can sort all that out.

However, I do believe that evidence respecting the state of mind of Lawson is something that can be considered, and evidence of the type you're talking about may be probative on that topic even if it's not the predicate for a finding of contempt, if you understand the distinction I'm drawing. Do you?

MR. MERRITT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right. So I think you-all have some homework to do, both of you, to sort that out.

And I agree with Mr. Thomasch that I want to

hear the things dealt with in E1 and E2 in that order and discretely because then I've got a record altogether at one place in which to make findings. And I don't know that this kind of information is helpful even if it's a predicate for contempt as opposed to an evidence of state of mind or evidence of contemptuous conduct of some kind.

I hope it can be presented. I'd like to have it presented separately. And I hear Mr. Strapp and Mr. Thomasch basically saying that that's a good idea, and I do, too.

MR. MERRITT: Judge Payne, may I ask a question by way of clarification?

THE COURT: I always get in trouble when you do that.

MR. MERRITT: To use the simplest example I can think of, let's take someone like Dr. Weaver, who is an expert who will, I believe, be addressing both colorability and infringement.

Does the Court anticipate that we would call him once to deal with colorability, and then there will be some sort of a gatekeeping process by the Court, and then we'll be asked to call him a second time?

THE COURT: There won't be any gatekeeping in

the sense of dealing with any issue. It's just I want it all to be in one place at one time so that I understand what you-all, each of you, think is the evidence on the colorability question and the evidence of the infringement question. I think it may be you have to call them back in order to do that, but I don't envision any decisional process between the two.

MR. MERRITT: That's what we were trying to figure out because, as a practical matter, just putting a witness on, there are a couple ways to do it. We can call the witness twice or, since this is a bench proceeding, we can say, Your Honor, we're going to ask Dr. Weaver about the colorability issue. And then when that's concluded, simply highlight that we're moving on to another issue. We just want to be sure that we present the proof in the way you would like to see us do it.

THE COURT: I do understand that mode of proof, but I think in this in instance, it's going to be easier to call them back. And the same thing for you. And in fact, gentlemen, just a minute, and ladies, excuse me. I need to get my copy of my order.

Yes. The order provides, this is what I thought, that all of the evidence on colorability from both sides, opening, response and reply, will come in

as what's called the first offering, and then the second offering, all of the evidence from each side will come in on that issue. That's what the meaning of E3 is.

MR. THOMASCH: Understood, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And we can put in the evidence of the other -- if other infringing conduct has been charged and discovered, then it can be considered as other infringing conduct.

If it comes in as evidence of a state of mind or for some other purpose, it can be presented apart from these two locations, but it will be considered, assuming that it's pertinent.

All right. Are those the two things that were in your letter, I believe?

MR. STRAPP: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Now, is there anything else that you folks want to take up?

MR. MERRITT: Not from the ePlus side.

MR. THOMASCH: There is one item from Lawson's side.

THE COURT: What's that, sir?

MR. THOMASCH: And that is, Your Honor, briefly, we're in an unusual situation now as the case has been brought down to the changes relevant with

respect to Claim 26 where we have identified two changes. What the changes are are not in dispute at all. The functional effect of the changes is not in dispute.

What's in dispute is the significance of those changes from not significant at all to case dispositive, prove our point. And that issue, frankly, depends largely on what was the basis for claiming that Claim 26 was infringed at the first trial.

The only place where the real colorability evidence is addressed, and our arguments are addressed in ePlus's submission on contempt, is at page 16 of their submission. In the last paragraph, they allege what they did not rely on. They say twice, We did not rely on certain evidence to prove infringement of Claim 26.

They do not say what they did rely on to prove infringement of Claim 26. And we would contend that we have shown what they relied on and that's why our changes are very significant.

THE COURT: What submissions are you speaking of?

MR. THOMASCH: Your Honor, in the order that we've been discussing of January 24, 2013, docket

1002, you called for submissions on page 2, paragraph F. You asked for a submission from ePlus that was made on February 11. And it is that submission on page 16 --

THE COURT: What's the docket number of that?

MR. THOMASCH: I do not have, I'm sorry, Your

Honor, the docket number of ePlus's submission of that
date.

THE COURT: What date was it submitted?

MR. THOMASCH: It was submitted on

February 11 of 2013. It's called, "Plaintiff ePlus,

Inc.'s Prehearing Statement Of Position On Contempt."

THE COURT: That would be 1008?

MR. THOMASCH: That sounds approximately right.

THE COURT: Well, it's sealed so I can't see it. You-all have put it in secret, so I can't see it.

MR. THOMASCH: Your Honor, I just would read one of the two sentences to Your Honor that says, "ePlus did not rely upon the capability of including items from a punchout catalog on the same requisition as items found in searching the catalogs in the item master to prove infringement of Claim 26 because there is no such requirement in any element of Claim 26. And we would disagree with that statement.

I think both parties know that that change has been made so it no longer can punch out, put on the same requisition a punchout search and an item master search. Everybody agrees that can no longer be done and it used to be something that could be done. And they're saying that that's, in a sense, irrelevant, and we're saying it's essential. And the relevance or lack thereof of that change depends primarily on what was contended and proved at the merits trial when Dr. Weaver, in particular, testified and did his demonstrations, we would allege.

And TiVo tells us that in defending this case, I believe that Lawson is entitled as a matter of due process to understand what ePlus says that it contended and proved at the first trial and to understand that so we can rebut it.

They are now saying they didn't rely on that evidence at trial. We think they did. And we feel like that really crystallizes this case for Your Honor. We don't actually have a dispute about what the change is. We have a dispute about the significance of it, and that dispute ultimately lies in the record from the first trial. And I don't know how we are to bring that to Your Honor's attention because the hearing on April 2, 3 and 4 seems like a

very bad place us to be telling Your Honor what was said at the last trial.

TiVo would have suggested to us that that be done pretrial. We have had seven letters between us to the Court on this subject. We have consistently requested in those letters that plaintiff be required to tell us what they believe was contended and proved, and we be required to respond to that. And we would once again ask the Court to enact that sort of requirement before we go to trial because we think that crystallizes the dispute about the significance of the undisputed changes that were indeed made to punchout and to Configurations 3 and 5.

MR. STRAPP: Your Honor, this is Michael Strapp. Can I respond to that, please?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. STRAPP: Our understanding of TiVo and all of the cases that have applied TiVo, the district courts that have had contempt hearings post-TiVo, is that TiVo does not require on a contempt hearing to reopen the trial record, pore through the transcript, try to decipher the black box that was the jury room and make out what the verdict was.

In fact, no case post-TiVo has so held as
Lawson has suggested TiVo should be interpreted. And

we set this all out in extensive letter briefing several months ago to Your Honor.

In fact, there is one case that we cited in our opening brief, and that will also be featured in the reply brief that we will be filing tomorrow, on the 8th, called "Arlington Industries," in which this issue was squarely presented to a District Court.

The question was whether or not a party who was contending that it had made certain modifications to an infringing product should be permitted to even present evidence regarding those changes if the claim that was at issue in that case didn't require the feature that had been changed.

And what the District Court said in this case in Arlington Industries was, it granted a motion in limine to exclude that evidence because it said, quoting from TiVo, that if a modification was made to a "randomly chosen feature," that can't be the basis for a finding of more than colorable differences here.

And what that means -- and here is probably the crux of the disagreement, is that you don't measure whether or not a change is relevant to a prior finding of infringement based on poring through a thousand-page trial record, but rather you look to the element of the claim that was found to infringe to

make that benchmark determination.

And if you find that the element of the claim doesn't require the feature or the functionality that was modified or removed, then as a matter of law there cannot be a finding of more than colorable differences.

That's the inquiry that TiVo directs courts to undertake, and that's how TiVo has been interpreted by every court that has looked at TiVo after that decision was handed down by the Federal Circuit in 2011. Not a single court has interpreted it the way Lawson urges Your Honor to interpret it.

So we think that the contempt proceeding should go forward as planned. There doesn't need to be some sort of prehearing issue on this front. It will be teed up in the briefs that have already been filed and in the reply briefs that will be filed, but we think it's simply a matter of comparing the elements of Claim 26, the modification that has been made by Lawson, and determining whether or not that modification is relevant to any of the claim elements in Claim 26.

MR. THOMASCH: Your Honor, that does crystallize the fact that we are seeing this completely differently, we are reading the law

differently, and we're going into trial with a fundamental misunderstanding of what the trial is.

TiVo talks about "contended" and "proved at trial." The Arlington case cited by Mr. Strapp did not involve a trial. There was never a trial in Arlington. There was a confession of judgment. It was a totally different situation. Here there was a trial. The trial left an extensive verdict. The verdict does delineate between different configurations and different product claims.

TiVo tells you, you must sort through that and you don't look at the claims. TiVo rejected the analysis of colorability that is derived from the infringement analysis of the claims. The first stage is a product-to-product comparison, and here is where our product changed fundamentally, and everyone knows it. There's no dispute about it. And what changed was the functionality that was demonstrated to the jury as the proof of infringement. And we believe that if we could get past this legal issue of what TiVo says, we could have judgment as a matter of law.

THE COURT: Mr. Thomasch, what you really want to do is go into the mind of the jury and see what the jury decided and that isn't what TiVo requires. And Mr. Strapp's got it, I think in my

judgment, about right. This is rehashing a whole bunch of communication that went on with eight or nine letters that I read through before I issued the order of January 24.

So I think we'll proceed as indicated and without having a dive into the mind of the jury in the other trial. So I think that will take care of that. I hope it does.

In any event, how many witnesses do you expect to call, Mr. Strapp?

MR. STRAPP: Your Honor, we anticipate calling -- Dr. Weaver will be our one technical expert. And we also have a remedies damages expert. That's Dr. Ugone. Those are our two experts.

In terms of fact witnesses, we don't have any ePlus witnesses we intend to call, but we do intend to call adversely in our case Mr. Christopherson, Mr. Lohkamp and Mr. Hanson.

THE COURT: Are you playing part of
Mr. Hager's deposition if he doesn't come or call him
in?

MR. MERRITT: We would like to call him and have him there in person. If not, we will go to plans B or C, as previously discussed.

THE COURT: Well, I hope we can be here in

person.

MR. MERRITT: Well, we would certainly prefer that and we understand that Mr. Thomasch would as well.

THE COURT: Yes. How many witnesses are you going to put on, Mr. Thomasch?

MR. THOMASCH: Your Honor, actually, I do not have that at the moment. We certainly have a technical expert and we have a damages expert. We will be questioning the witnesses that are in our employ that are called during the plaintiff's case. We may have some additional witnesses that will be on our witness list at that time. We have not yet made a final decision.

THE COURT: But how many in order of magnitude are you thinking you're going to draft from?

MR. THOMASCH: I would expect that with the -- counting the three that are our employees that are going to be called by the plaintiff, plus our two, that's five witnesses, and then I would expect that order of magnitude is zero to four more.

THE COURT: Excuse me a minute. Are you all hearing any clicking on your line?

MR. THOMASCH: Yes, Your Honor, but it has not prevented us from being able to hear what's being

said.

THE COURT: Do you know what it is?

MR. THOMASCH: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Has it been on your line before or do you think it's our on our line? We've had some problems with our phone.

MR. THOMASCH: We have not had problems, but I'm in a conference room, and I can't say that I've used this phone enough to be certain, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, it may be. I don't know. I can hear it.

MR. THOMASCH: Sounds like a creaky rocking chair, Your Honor, but no one here is in a rocking chair.

THE COURT: Yeah. It's a little early for that for you all.

The schedule here, how many -- let me go at it this way: How many exhibits do you all anticipate filing for ePlus and for Lawson, respectively?

Mr. Strapp?

MR. STRAPP: Your Honor, we haven't finalized our list of exhibits. We do intend to provide a list of exhibits to Lawson next week. We're in the process of trying to narrow that list down to a manageable size, but we don't anticipate it's going to be a large

volume.

evidence.

THE COURT: This is the 7th of March and you're proposing to do that on the 12th.

MR. STRAPP: Right.

THE COURT: How about you, Mr. Thomasch?

MR. THOMASCH: Your Honor, I'm sorry. We will do it after Mr. Strapp, and I also don't have that number, but I am hoping it will be considerably fewer than what was originally in the case and trying to make a list of ones that will actually come into

THE COURT: The 11th is Monday. I'm trying to see whether you-all don't need to advance this schedule a little bit because I don't get until the 28th of March a resolution of what it is that has been agreed to and then we start the hearing on the 2nd of April. That's pretty --

MR. THOMASCH: Your Honor, what day would you like them?

THE COURT: I'd like to have all of this concluded by the 20th of March. I'd like to have all of those exchanges finished by the 20th of March. Could you all tender another order that has that in there or call in here and just tell Mr. Beerbower what dates you want to put in for March 12, 15, 21, 25 and

28, and he can pencil them in, and I'll initial them and just sign this order?

MR. THOMASCH: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. You-all call
Mr. Beerbower and tell him that. You-all can talk
about it after this call.

Now, is that everything for you-all?

MR. MERRITT: Judge, with regard to the Monday 11:30 deadline on Mr. Hager, was the Court contemplating a conference call or just giving you notice by then of what the resolution is?

THE COURT: I'd like to have a call so we can resolve everything if there is anything to resolve.

MR. MERRITT: Judge, let me ask you, since Mr. Hager is separately represented, would you like us to give Mr. Witthoefft notice of that so that we can get Mr. Hager's definitive position at that time?

THE COURT: Absolutely.

MR. MERRITT: I will do that.

THE COURT: And he can sit in on the call if he wants to. He's invited, but I can't order him to be here.

All right. Is that it for you-all?

MR. THOMASCH: Your Honor, it's Mr. Thomasch for Lawson. Only to note, Your Honor, that yesterday

we made a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5). That motion by the normal briefing schedule will be fully briefed before the time for the hearing, and we would request oral argument on the motion at the Court's earliest convenience.

THE COURT: Well, I have to tell you that back in early February, I was preparing to convene a conference call with you-all to ask you about the proceedings that the Federal Circuit required which said to consider how to modify the injunction or whatever the order of the Court said.

Then I learned of Mr. Robertson's untimely and sad passing. And the other thing was I didn't think I had any authority to do any of that until the mandate of the Federal Circuit was issued. And then on the 11th, three days later, the mandate was issued, but you-all all had said put everything on hold until you get things sorted out and can talk about where you want to go and go where you want to go.

So I regard that I need to deal with the question of the injunction and the modification of it and would like to set a schedule for that. But, now, do you view that this is a substitute for that, Mr. Thomasch? I haven't read your motion. I know you have filed one, but I haven't read it.

MR. THOMASCH: Well, it does make a formal motion to request that the Court address the Federal Circuit mandate and presents our position as to what the proper resolution of addressing it would be. Your Honor did require, you'll recall, earlier this year for the parties to submit position statements with respect to the effect of the Federal Circuit decision on the injunction as well as on the contempt proceeding as separate issues.

At that time, however, the mandate had not issued. We put our position in to Your Honor. Then later the mandate issued, and we wanted to make sure that we had made a formal motion and not simply relied on having briefed our preferences, but actually --

THE COURT: Well, it all got held up because of the untimely death of Mr. Robertson. You took the position in your letter or position statement that the Court didn't have jurisdiction to deal with the injunction until the mandate issued. And I think that's right. All of it was up before the Federal Circuit.

So you say you filed this under Rule 60?

MR. THOMASCH: Yes. In other words, we have made a motion, a formal motion, to dissolve or modify the injunction, and Rule 60(b)(5), of course, allows

that when the underpinning of an order has been reversed or vacated or where changed circumstances would make the prospective continuation of an order unfair. And we believe that both of those grounds apply here.

So now that the mandate was issued 3 1/2 weeks ago, we wanted to simply formally request that the Court address that. We believe that two things are central. One is that in order to determine whether there should be an injunction going forward, it is incumbent on the Court to reevaluate the four-factor test under eBay. And we believe that the existing record would not support the continuation of an injunction. If the Court were to have a new --

THE COURT: I mean, do you demonstrate why you think that in this paper that you filed?

MR. THOMASCH: Yes, we do, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

MR. THOMASCH: We incorporated by reference our prior briefing because we didn't want to bog the Court down, but it is essentially a self-contained document, Your Honor, that says why we believe we're entitled to the relief.

THE COURT: Then you have to file a reply here for ePlus. So you-all need to -- when are you

going to do that?

MR. STRAPP: Your Honor, I believe that our opposition is due on March 18. That's when we intended to file.

THE COURT: All right. So you're filing it in accord with the rules.

MR. MERRITT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right. That's fine. I'll hear the rely then and we'll go from there.

All right. That helps me. One of the reasons I wanted to talk to you-all today was how do we proceed from here as respects satisfying the order of the Circuit now that the mandate has been issued.

All right. I'll await being informed on that and that takes care of everything, I think. So thank you all for being available and I'll talk to you on Monday.

MR. MERRITT: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. THOMASCH: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Bye-bye.

(The proceedings were adjourned at 4:35 PM.)

I, Diane J. Daffron, certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript of the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

DIANE J. DAFFRON, RPR, CCR DATE.